Description
The ANS Task Force, within its Strategic Plan for 2020-2025 (Objective 2.2 and 2.3), identifies a need to evaluate and prioritize pathways, develop risk management strategies, and encourage implementation of non-regulatory and regulatory measures to prevent the establishment and spread of aquatic invasive species (AIS) in waters of the United States. While evaluating pathways, the ANS Task Force determined that more information is needed to assess the risk of spreading AIS via the seaplane pathway and develop measures to mitigate this risk. This project will address these objectives. International air travel is a significant pathway for the introduction of nonnative pest species, based on data collected at U.S. Department of Agriculture inspection stations (McCullough, et al., 2006. Biol. Invas. 8: 611–630). However, there has been no conclusive data to quantify the risk of transport of AIS represented by seaplanes. Air travel has historically connected otherwise isolated areas, providing a means to transport species from one location to another. The risk of species movement associated with commercial airplanes and air cargo carriers has been previously evaluated; however, the ANS Task Force Prevention Subcommittee found that information on the potential risks associated with seaplanes is currently lacking. Seaplanes may be a more direct risk to aquatic habitats, as opposed to passenger or cargo aircraft. Preliminary studies of the seaplane transportation pathway in Alaska, have concluded that seaplanes have contributed to the spread of Elodea, an invasive aquatic plant within Alaska. The spread of Elodea could have significant economic impacts on fisheries, businesses, and recreation, if left unchecked. Currently, the significance of the seaplane pathway as a vector for high risk species, such as Dressinid mussels, within the contiguous United States, and between Alaska and the contiguous United States is poorly understood. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service), co-chair of the ANS Task Force, requests proposals to build upon previous studies and evaluate the risk of the seaplane pathway as a vector for AIS. This risk analysis should include two components: a risk assessment and identification of risk management actions. The risk assessment is needed to identify and quantify the range of waterbodies that are utilized by seaplanes and what AIS may be transported through this pathway. This information will be used to identify risk management actions that can be taken by seaplane operators, manufacturers, and others to reduce the spread of AIS. The assessment should be conducted for the 48 contiguous states and Alaska. Your risk analysis proposal must address: Identifying the travel patterns of seaplanes within the 48 contiguous states and Alaska; this would include the location and distance traveled between origin and final destinations, frequency of travel, and average time spent at each location. Identifying what AIS potentially could be moved by seaplane operation. Identifying high risk areas of the plane (e.g., hull, float, wheel well), as well as operational or distribution practices and behaviors that may facilitate transport of AIS. Assessing the extent to which measures are taken by seaplane operators to prevent the transport of AIS. Developing evidence-based recommendations for preventing the establishment and spread of AIS through seaplane operation and distribution, working with seaplane pilots to ensure the recommendations are realistic and practical. Developing evidence-based recommendations for preventing the spread of AIS through seaplane manufacturing to consider possible redesign opportunities if high-risk areas of the plane are identified. It is the intent that the results of this assessment may be used by the ANS Task Force, regional ANS panels, States, and partners to develop or enhance seaplane decontamination and inspection protocols or other industry standards, processes, or programs. Risk management strategies may also inform State and non-governmental educational and awareness campaigns that inform seaplane pilots about the risks of AIS and encourage preventative behaviors to reduce this risk. Proposals submitted for this award should address how the anticipated results will assist the ANS Task Force in reaching the goal of preventing the establishment and spread of AIS by seaplanes through non-regulatory and regulatory measures. Following the assessment, the ANS Task Force will work with federal and state agency personnel and others who are actively involved with seaplane operation, seaplane manufacturing or distribution, and AIS management to facilitate adoption of the recommendations, as appropriate. Following award selection, and prior to commencement of work, the successful applicant must meet with the Service. During the meeting, the applicant will summarize the work plan (methods and timetable) and review the draft outline of the final report, included in the application, with the Service. The Service will provide feedback on anticipated deliverables meeting ANSTF needs. Overall, the final report should: Identify and quantify the risk of spreading AIS though seaplane operation, by reporting on the number and type of waterbodies used by seaplanes, the distance traveled, and potential high risk AIS that may be transported. Data should be depicted on maps when possible. Identify high risk areas of the plane that may facilitate transport of AIS. Identify any specific operational practices or behaviors of seaplane operators, manufacturers and distributers that may facilitate transport of AIS. Report on the type and frequency of AIS preventative measures performed by seaplane operators. Recommend priority best management practices to reduce the risk of AIS spread by seaplanes. Recommend possible redesign opportunities or industry standards that could be considered by seaplane manufactures to reduce the spread of AIS. Once the risk analysis is complete, the grantee will be required to present (30 – 45 minutes, in person or virtually) the findings and recommendations to the Service and ANS Task Force, along with their final risk analysis report.